Re-inventing Explosive
Hazard Clearance
Management in IRAQ
By Mark Wilkinson, Ph.D. [ United Nations Mine Action Service ]

T

he Government of Iraq viewed rehabilitation of infrastructure contaminated with explosives during the
conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as a prerequisite to socioeconomic recovery and
political stability, which, in turn, established a need for the mine action community to deploy qualified,
certified clearance teams as quickly as possible. While these teams could deploy quickly, their reliance on international staff and their associated costs attributable to security and other factors introduced a high overhead
business model that became an accepted standard during a first clearance phase from 2015 to 2019, despite the
understanding that this model could not be sustained indefinitely. A shift in donor priorities and reduced budgets
effectively introduced a second clearance phase beginning in 2020. The challenge to the mine action community
became the development of a more cost-effective, time-sensitive approach to clearance so as to reduce costs to
levels acceptable to donors without compromising clearance standards.
In response, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Iraq through its (1) evidence-based analysis and
measurement of data and (2) effects-based approach to clearance delivery introduced a low cost, high return
business model. This model offered a more efficient approach when compared to previous like-for-like models, in
addition to providing useful tool sets applicable for other locations and conditions similar to those found in Iraq.
As of December 2017, west Mosul was heavily contaminated not only with explosive remnants of war (ERW) but
also with what proved to be thousands of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) left by ISIL. These devices denied
access to sites and infrastructure, thereby delaying the complicated task of render safe/removal efforts consistent with international standards.1,2

Phase 1: The Problem
The urgency and conditions that determined the need to deploy

UNMAS-managed contracts performed 1,823 clearance tasks, ren-

qualified, certified clearance teams quickly also de facto dictated the

dering safe/removing 67,335 EH while clearing 10.6 million sq m of

terms for what became the Phase 1 business model of clearance, lasting

land and counting.3

roughly from 2015 to 2019.

occupied by ISIL remained contaminated (see Figure 1) while budgets

companies (ICC) for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and impro-

available to support clearance began to decline, partly because donor

vised explosive device disposal (IEDD) expertise despite their rela-

priorities and strategies had changed. Nonetheless, for the Government

tive high cost attributable (1) to their reliance on foreign experts;

of Iraq, rebuilding and rehabilitating infrastructure remained critical

and, concomitantly, (2) to their need for protection provided by pri-

and depended upon EH clearance to proceed despite the ongoing risks

vate security detachments.

posed by ISIL insurgents and related security costs (see Figure 2, ISIL

Although costly, the model achieved the desired results. From
2016 to 2020, explosive hazard (EH) clearance teams under
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Yet, at the end of 2019, an estimated 2,522 sq km in an area formerly

During Phase 1, UNMAS relied on international commercial
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Activity); and therein, lay the crux of the business problem entering
Phase 2: do more with less.

Figure 1. Explosive hazard contamination in Iraq, UNMAS Information Management Unit, 4 February 2021.
All graphics courtesy of UNMAS.
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Figure 2. Comparison of open source and Amaq (ISIL News Agency) data as
compiled by, and courtesy of Joint Analysis Unit (JAU), United Nations Assistance
Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), 27 January 2021.

Time. Data analysis by UNMAS since December
2017 has shown time-on-task varies as a function
of (1) events leading to contamination; (2) extent of
contamination; (3) environment type; (4) exposure
of operators based on the device and/or its design;
(5) operators’ experience, (i.e., skills and assets
appropriate for clearance and safe removal of threats
as assessed); and (6) events beyond operational con-

From the outset, UNMAS realized the high overhead model could
not be sustained indefinitely, and several factors drove its change.

trol, (e.g., security and COVID-19 restrictions), which either disrupt
or delay clearance operations.

Security. UNMAS recognized that, effectively, it was managing a

Measurement. UNMAS reasoned that these factors when mea-

hybrid clearance situation: neither peacekeeping nor humanitarian due

sured systematically4 could provide an evidence-based estimate of

to the continuing security threats. After their retreat from Mosul in

relative hazardousness for contaminated areas with implications for

December 2017, ISIL’s remaining fighters did not leave; they switched

time required for safe clearance, removal, and disposal of hazards
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consistent with IMAS standards; and, importantly, for team compo-

requirements and tasks as received from the Directorate of Mine Action

sition, training, and deployment (i.e., assigning teams appropriately

(DMA), Iraq’s national mine action authority; and (2) deliver results

trained for each task). Accordingly, by mid-2019, UNMAS began

meeting IMAS standards at reduced costs and a higher rate of return.

development of what became a lethality index, which—for the first

Expediency. If the new ideas being developed offered a poten-

time—classified clearance tasks according to environment and techni-

tial low-cost, high-return business model, UNMAS also would need

cal factors (see Time), and assigned values for locations, thereby pro-

to change its statements of work, which initially focused on specific

viding an evidence-based measurement of lethality with implications

requirements for clearance teams and their capability rather than out-

for skillset, time, and cost. The more lethal the task, and the longer

comes, thereby introducing an unintended bias into the process that

the time required for render safe and removal, the greater the skills

favored ICCs largely for reason of expediency: Given that their accredi-

required and associated hourly cost.

tation, team composition, and readiness to deploy solved the urgency

Fit-for-purpose. At the same time, UNMAS began evaluating

issue, ICCs became the only viable clearance solution in the short term.

alternative team compositions and, by mid-2019, introduced on a trial

Double jeopardy. As of 2018, this safe choice pattern began to

basis a light version based on the decades-old, proven rapid response

repeat. New contracts nearly always specified size, capability, and

team (RRT) concept.5 These highly-mobile, cost-effective teams relied

scope that favored bidders with similar, previous experience. This

exclusively on fully-trained Iraqi staff for high-risk search (HRS), EOD,

generic, more-of-the-same approach de facto endorsed the ICC profile

IEDD, and geographic information systems (GIS) reporting, equipped

as a norm for clearance teams, negating nongovernmental organiza-

with integral medical support, and deployable anywhere in the liber-

tions (NGO) cost advantages. Since virtually all ICC teams were domi-

ated areas of Iraq within a twenty-four-hour period. The RRTs were

nated by large numbers of international personnel, their statements of

backed by a single, on-call international technical advisor who did not

work built in higher personnel and security costs as an accepted cost

deploy. The RRTs relied on local security, eliminating the constraints

of doing business. NGOs accredited for clearance in Iraq could there-

and costs associated with predominately international staff and less

fore find themselves responding to statements of work that assumed

mobile-heavy teams equipped with mechanical assets.

security costs based on an ICC model despite NGOs’ reliance on less

Repositioning. UNMAS positioned itself to (1) rewrite the way

costly local staff as well as associated operational advantages, includ-

business was conducted through statements of work based on evidence-

ing a reduced security requirement, thereby negating their competi-

based data measuring time-on-task as a function of relative diffi-

tive advantage while adopting the ICC’s disadvantages. This situation

culty (the lethality index) and validated operational concepts (e.g.,

would not begin to change until late 2018 when UNMAS awarded its

RRT teams) that could provide both flexibility in tune with changing

first commercial contract for EH clearance in Iraq to an NGO.

Phase 2: The Changes
Statements of Work. The experience of Phase 1 strongly sug-

evidence-based assessment of the intended geographical area,

gested other changes were necessary including re-design of statements

the impact of the conflict there, its IED and EH threat charac-

of work, the part of each contract that detailed the methodology for
delivery of services using an effects-based approach toward delivery of

teristics, likely task types, and mobility/travel requirements.7
•

services. By 2019, UNMAS was developing evidence-based measurement useful in assessing time-on-task for appropriate skillsets (the
lethality index) and adapting and testing an agile, flexible team concept

a guide to ensure adequacy of delivery proposals.
•

Capability. Clearance partners demonstrate their capability

(the RRTs) which, taken together, promised the low-cost, high-return

to deliver the required clearance outcome(s) through a detailed

model sought for a Phase 2.

analysis of tasks, and their working procedures and practices as

Effects-based. This inherently fairer approach gave potential
clearance partners more freedom and an opportunity to focus on

meeting relevant national/international standards.
•

Enhancement. Clearance partners include mentoring and

outcomes rather than dictating means of delivery. Thereby, UNMAS

development of both individual and team skills in a logical way

not only achieved a desired outcome but also tested potential clear-

such that teams can plan, deliver, and report effectively on the

ance partners’ existing knowledge while encouraging a just enough

task types they have been trained to conduct: capacity enhance-

approach to resources, thus promoting innovation and cost-effectiveness while meeting IMAS standards.
Accordingly, consistent with its evidence-based measurement and
agile, flexible team concepts, future statements of work were framed
using an effects-based approach to clearance delivery around the following parameters:
•
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Requirements. Clearance partners use environmental and
technical factors8 derived from UNMAS intelligence analysis as

6

ment is as important as clearance.
•

Risk

management. Clearance partners demonstrate a

dynamic and proactive approach to risk management to predefined levels that are “as low as reasonably practicable.”
Transition. By 2019, UNMAS Iraq had worked through details of a
two-step approach as agreed with its procurement partners to transi-

Intelligence analysis. UNMAS includes an initial work

tion to an effects-based approach and was ready with a first clearance

package based on lethality index measurements to ensure that

contract, including a statement of work based on three parameters

clearance partners base their proposals on a thorough and

open to both ICCs and NGOs. Accordingly, UNMAS aimed to
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shorten the mobilization phase by providing precise environ-

•

that UNMAS could comment and/or intervene constructively

mental and technical information related to current and poten-

•

•

and developmentally to address concerns at any time.

tial locations, thereby ensuring ICCs and NGOs could reflect

This first step in the transition to full effects-based clearance activi-

this information in terms of proposed team composition and

ties was delivered with a contract for clearance in Ninewa that com-

equipment as cost effectiveness/value for money;

menced in January 2020, followed by the second step in October 2020

limit international staff and increase national staff levels and

when the new grant partnership model was signed and initiated.

ownership, both of which are consistent with a commitment to

Statements of work for a two-year time frame included management,

mentoring and development of national resources along with

programs, operations, support, quality assurance, leadership, risk

cost reduction; and

management, and resource mobilization as parameters in anticipa-

ensure proper oversight by linking the operational delivery to a

tion of fully-qualified, Iraqi-managed clearance capability sustained

pilot study using an UNMAS risk management tool set dating

by international and national NGOs.

from contract signature onward, affording a visibility of risk so

Phase 3: The Transition
Even as UNMAS was developing an evidence-based measurement

•

tool useful in assessing time-on-task for appropriate skillsets (the

Partnership. UNMAS would approach operational oversight
and quality assurance on a cooperative basis, with an emphasis

lethality index) and adapting and testing an agile, flexible team con-

on coaching and mentoring delivery partners so as to build local

cept that, taken together, promised the low-cost, high-return model

capacity, confidence, and independence.

sought in Phase 2, the experience of Phase 1 strongly suggested other

•

changes were necessary. These included a transition in advance of an

Sustainability. Delivery partners should train initially with
minimal direct international technical supervision so as to

UNMAS exit to a stronger leadership role for DMA. During this tran-

strengthen and sustain national capability to the point that it is

sition, UNMAS saw itself moving into a consulting role, gradually

self-sustaining and self-supervising.

transferring ownership of the day-to-day management of clearance

•

tasks under contract. By mid-2019, UNMAS Iraq had introduced four

of the areas it operates within, thus bolstering acceptance of

management initiatives to guide those making decisions on both sides
while managing the expectations of all, namely:

Identity. National capability should represent the ethnography
clearance teams and their work.

•

Gender. UNMAS and the DMA would share a leadership role
to assure that all strategic, managerial, and operational decisionmaking, planning, and participation would reflect both women’s
and men’s experiences, needs, and perspectives.
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Cost $

Sq m

Environment

Type

Contractor

Dec-18

7,486,814

639,450

Rural

Simple

ICC 3 Sinjar

ICC 1 Mosul

Aug-18

8,509,911

2,089,806

Rural

Simple

ICC 3 Kirkuk

ICC 2 Mosul

Dec-19

2,548,636

Rural

Simple

ICC 2 Sinjar

Cost $

Sq m

Environment

Type

Contractor

Jun-18

10,232,049

179,472

Urban

Complex

ICC 3 Mosul

Feb-18

11,156,652

164,188

Urban

Complex

Aug-20

2,786,194

Urban

Complex

Table 1.

Nov-18

Aug-18

Jun-20

Aug-20

Apr-20

Feb-20

Dec-19

Oct-19

Aug-19

Jun-19

Apr-19

Feb-19

Dec-18

Oct-18

Aug-18

Jun-18

Apr-18

Feb-18

Figure 3.

Sep-18

0

0

Table 2.

25TH ANNIVERSARY ISSUE @ SUMMER 2021

123

Benefits
Contract Costs: Mixed Simple 2D & 3D

The benefits of an effects-based approach to clearance deliv-
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tion costs, and require only a locally-based office to
sustain operations. Any required international staff can

Cost $

Sq m

Environment

Jun-18

6,374,302

183,906

Mixed

ICC 1 RRT

no longer required.

Sep-18

3,996,182

111,235

Mixed

NGO 1 SAD

Redefined role. Relationship with delivery part-

Jun-18

3,782,356

740,146

Mixed

NGO 2 Ninewa

Jul-19

3,691,709

Mixed

NGO 1 Anbar

Aug-20

2,343,195

Mixed

NGO 1 Fallujah

work remotely with travel limited to quality assurance,
technical oversight, or training purposes until they are
•

Feb-20

Ownership. Locally-recruited teams generate both

Dec-19

Jun-18

ments, while maintaining IMAS quality standards.
•

Oct-19

0

on international personnel and related security require-

Aug-19

a two-year period, largely as a result of reduced reliance

3,000,000

Jun-19

like-for-like clearance contracts by a factor of five during
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Value for money. A reduction in the contracted cost of
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Feb-19

•

6,000,000
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additional benefits are worth noting:

7,000,000
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able, fully-national, and non-profit clearance capability. Three

Aug-18

ery are clear, beginning with the most important: a sustain-

ners is now based on a clear definition of pragmatic
outcomes, when-needed support, and operational and
quality oversight.

Type

Contractor

Table 3.

The Future of “Just Enough”
UNMAS Iraq through its (1) evidence-based analysis and measure-

important, the timing of this low cost, high return model coincides

ment of data and (2) effects-based approach to clearance delivery

with the on-going transfer of UNMAS Iraq’s evolving role and trans-

offers a logical and coherent approach to planning, reduced cost, and

fer of remaining clearance activities and related management to DMA

performance gains when compared to previous like-for-like projects,

as part of a well-planned exit strategy.

and useful tool sets applicable for other locations as well. Most
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